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Abstract
In March 2020, the uncertain outlook for the United States in the face of the COVID-19
pandemic prompted extremely high demand for cash and near-cash assets. Amid intense
selling pressure from investors, securities dealers were unable to fully absorb the high
volume of trade orders into their inventory due to balance sheet capacity and funding
constraints. As dealer capacity declined and demand for liquidity continued rising, volatility
spread to the critical and normally highly liquid market for US Treasury securities,
prompting the Federal Reserve to increase open market operations (March 12) and begin
historically large purchases of US Treasuries (March 16). On March 17, the Fed used its
Section 13(3) emergency authority to establish the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF),
modeled after a program that the Fed implemented in response to the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) in 2008. The PDCF lent to primary dealers at the primary credit rate for up to 90 days,
collateralized by dealers’ inventory of securities. Compared to the 2008 PDCF, the 2020
PDCF accepted a narrower range of collateral, offered terms longer than overnight, and did
not charge a penalty fee for frequent use. Use of the PDCF peaked at $35.6 billion in loans
outstanding the week of April 15, 2020, then gradually decreased. The PDCF expired on
March 31, 2021, after two extensions to its operating dates.
Keywords: COVID-19, market liquidity, primary dealers, PDCF

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering market support programs in response to COVID-19. Cases are available from the Journal
of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
As the economic outlook turned negative in
in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, broad
risk-off sentiment drove heavy investor
demand for cash and other liquid assets.
Amid a “dash-for-cash” in March 2020,
nonbanks3 and foreign holders sold record
amounts
of
less-liquid,
long-dated
Treasuries in favor of shorter-dated assets
(TIC 2021; He, Nagel, and Song 2020, 3, 9).
At first, securities dealers who intermediate
in short-term markets absorbed the
increased trade flows, including the sales of
Treasuries, but this reportedly expanded
dealers’ balance sheets against the
constraints imposed by regulatory or riskmanagement considerations, and by midMarch dealers became unable or unwilling to
continue acting as market-makers (FRB
2020b; Duffie 2020; Chen et al. 2021).
Without dealers providing liquidity, assets in
dealer-intermediated markets traded at
material discounts, and liquidity dried up in
even the most liquid market4 (FRB 2020b;
FRB and Goldberg 2020; Duffie 2020).
On March 12, the Fed responded by offering
$1.5 trillion in repurchase agreements, or
repos, in an effort to provide liquidity to
dealers (FRBNY 2020a; Duffie 2020). Takeup was low, however, with market
participants
blaming
balance-sheet
constraints and an inability to efficiently
distribute cash throughout the system
(Timiraos and Verlaine 2020). Beginning on
March 16, the Fed purchased $1 trillion in
Treasuries over three weeks, partly as a

Key Terms
Purpose: “Allow primary dealers to support smooth
market functioning and facilitate the availability of
credit to businesses and households” and “foster the
functioning of financial markets more generally”
(FRB 2020m; FRB 2020p).
Launch Dates

Authorized: March 17,
2020
Announced: March 17,
2020

Operational Date

March 20, 2020

End Date

March 31, 2021

Legal Authority

Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act

Source of Funding

Federal Reserve

Administrators

Federal Reserve Bank of
New York

Overall Size

Aggregate amount of
haircut-adjusted eligible
collateral that each
primary dealer could
issue to the Fed

Term

Overnight to 90-day
maturity, renewable
upon borrower’s
election

Rate

Primary credit rate (25
basis points)

Collateral

OMO-acceptable
collateral and
investment-grade
securities

Peak Utilization

$35.6 billion during the
week of April 15, 2020

Nonbanks, particularly relative value hedge funds, sold roughly $90 billion in less-liquid Treasuries as they
unwound basis trades (FSB 2020). (See Barth and Kahn (2020) for more information.)
4 Meanwhile, businesses and governments which normally issue commercial paper (CP) with multi-week
maturity began issuing paper that matured on a daily basis (FRB 2020b). Money market mutual funds (MMFs)
saw large outflows as investors demanded redemptions, and corporate debt markets stalled as nonfinancial
corporations sought funding while facing credit downgrades (FSB 2020).
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means of freeing up balance sheet space by reducing dealer inventory (FSB 2020). Yet these
purchases did not ease constraints as much as the Fed intended due to regulatory capital
requirements and the fact that the Fed pays for these Treasuries with reserves, which the
banking system must absorb (Duffie 2020).
As market conditions continued to deteriorate, the Fed announced on March 17 that it would
use its emergency lending authorities under Section 13(3) to re-establish the Primary Dealer
Credit Facility (PDCF), which lent to primary dealers with full recourse at the primary credit
(discount window) rate for a term up to 90 days (FRB 2020m). The Fed lent against the
dealer’s inventory of securities and applied haircuts based on the riskiness of the assets
pledged as collateral, which was revalued daily by the clearing bank, Bank of New York
Mellon (BNYM) (FRBNY 2020b).
The Fed established two “companion” facilities—the Commercial Paper Funding Facility5
(CPFF) on March 17 and the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility6 (MMLF) on March
18—to help stabilize short-term funding markets7 (Clarida, Duygan-Bump, and Scotti 2021).
On April 1, 2020, the Fed temporarily allowed bank holding companies to exempt reserves
and Treasuries from their Supplementary Leverage Ratio Rule (SLR) calculations to further
ease constraints on dealer balance sheets (FRB 2020h).
The COVID-era PDCF was modeled on a 2008 GFC predecessor that was established in
response to repo-market stress driven by concerns about dealer exposure to subprime
mortgages (Yang 2020; Martin and McLaughlin 2020). The 2008 PDCF accepted a greater
variety of collateral than the 2020 PDCF, extended credit only overnight, and charged regular
users of the facility a frequency-based fee (Yang 2020; Martin and McLaughlin 2020).

For more information on the CPFF, see Engbith (2021).
Money market mutual funds provide funding to dealers in the repo markets. For more information on the
MMLF, see Mott (2021).
7 Another facility, the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF), helped stem the risk-off activity in
corporate debt markets, which dealers intermediate, although dealer intermediation in these markets has
declined in recent years (Kargar et al. 2020).
5
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Lending through the pandemic-era PDCF began on March 20, 2020, and peaked three weeks
later at $35.6 billion (see Figure 1). For context, the 2008 PDCF reported $130 billion in loans
outstanding at the height of its use8 (Yang 2020). Initially scheduled to expire on September
30, 2020, with other emergency lending facilities, the Fed and Treasury extended the
operating window of the PDCF to December 31, 2020, and then again to March 31, 2021 (FRB
2020l; FRB 2020k). The facility shed its final holdings the week of April 21, 2021 (FRB
2020q). In its May 9, 2021, report to Congress, the Fed reported that, as of April 30, 2021, all
loans had been repaid, no losses were realized on the PDCF, and the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York had received interest, fees, and other revenue on the PDCF of $12.8 million (FRB
2021a).
Figure 1: Loans Outstanding at the PDCF

Source: Federal Reserve H.4.1 Statistical Release.

Summary Evaluation
The PDCF extended 356 loans to 21 primary dealers totaling $132 billion against $149 billion
worth of collateral (FRB 2022). The median borrowing term was 14 days (FRB 2022). 35%
of loans had terms greater than 84 days, while 22% of loans were overnight (FRB 2022).

Note that a greater range of collateral was eligible for the 2008 PDCF than the 2020 PDCF. Additionally, in
March 2020, only $340 billion in privately issued securities were financed in the tri-party repo market,
compared to $600 billion in August 2008 (Martin and McLaughlin 2020).
8
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By offering more favorable rates than dealers could find in the markets, the PDCF provided
a backstop for dealers to finance their inventory of securities, thus allowing dealers to
resume their intermediation and smooth market functioning (Martin and McLaughlin 2020;
Pozsar 2020). The PDCF became operational on March 20, 2020, and saw immediate and
sustained utilization through the end of April 2020 (Martin and McLaughlin 2020; FRB
2020b). In mid-April, when investors’ demand for liquidity across multiple asset classes rose
again, the higher order volume once again “clogged” the balance sheets of dealers, limiting
their ability to warehouse investor trade flows and causing the price of liquidity to rise (FRB
and Goldberg 2020; Duffie 2020). By May, the Fed found that dislocations in the market for
US Treasury securities had subsided, and measures of market functioning—such as market
depth, bid-ask spreads, and divergence of similar-maturity yields—had improved (FRB
2020b) (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Treasury Market Depth

Data retrieved from the interdealer broker community. Market depth indicates the quantity of an asset
available to buy or sell at the best posted bid and ask prices.
Source: FRB 2020.

Amid widespread turmoil such as in March 2020, evaluating any individual crisis-time
intervention on its own terms can be a challenge. This is especially true of the PDCF, which
the Fed established during a month that saw several efforts designed to alleviate constraints
on dealers, provide access to liquidity, and improve Treasury market functioning. Efforts
included expanded repo operations, historically large purchases of Treasuries, and dollar
swap lines with foreign central banks,9 as well as the launch of companion facilities in
interrelated markets: the CPFF for commercial paper (CP), the MMLF for money market

The rapid increase in supply was due to foreign investors (central banks and investors in tax havens) selling
about $300 billion in Treasuries, mutual funds selling roughly $15 billion, and net issuance of $150 billion by
the U.S. Treasury Department (He, Nagel, and Song 2020, 3). Foreign official institutions, including central
banks, sold roughly $60 billion in Treasuries in March 2020, due in part to emerging market economies raising
USD cash to satisfy funding needs and intervene in foreign exchange markets (TIC 2021; FSB 2020, 30). Dollar
swap lines established by the Fed helped relieve this pressure on the US Treasury market and the dealers who
intermediate it.
9
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mutual funds invested in commercial paper and municipal securities, and the Secondary
Market Corporate Credit Facility for corporate debt (FRB 2020b).
Utilization of the PDCF, CPFF, and MMLF peaked quickly after launch and, considered
together, these interventions appear to have had a beneficial effect on dealers, with
indicators of market functioning improving after their announcements (FRB 2020b) (see
Figure 3). Following the announcement of the CPFF on March 17, issuance of CP soon
returned to normal multi-week maturity (Chen et al. 2021; FRB 2020b). Carlson and
Macchiavelli (2021) show that the PDCF enhanced the ability of primary dealers to provide
intermediation services, specifically by facilitating the issuance of CP and negotiable
certificates of deposit (CD). They also show that CP and CD issuers benefited indirectly from
the PDCF, as the facility enabled issuers to issue more securities at lower cost when the CP
or CD that was issued was pledged as collateral to the PDCF by a dealer (Carlson and
Macchiavelli 2021).
Figure 3: Spreads Since PDCF Launch

Data retrieved from Bloomberg, Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index.
Source: Chen et al. 2021.

In the corporate debt market, the combined announcements of the PDCF and Primary and
Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facilities appear to have reversed the “dash for cash,”
and investor demand for liquidity—and the cost to dealers for supplying it—quickly receded
(Kargar et al. 2020, 4; Chen et al. 2021). Moreover, dealers’ apparent reluctance to absorb
corporate debt appears to have changed around the dates corresponding to the Fed’s
announcement of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (March 17) and the Primary and
Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facilities (March 23) (Kargar et al. 2020, 16) (see Figure
4). O’Hara and Zhou (2021) found that almost immediately after the announcement of the
PDCF, dealers reverted to accumulating inventories, and transaction costs for investmentgrade securities fell, even for large trading quantities (“block trades”) which become very
expensive in illiquid markets (O’Hara and Zhou 2020; Martin and McLaughlin 2020).
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Figure 4: Change in Dealer Inventory of Corporate Debt

Data retrieved from FINRA market sentiment tables.
Source: Kargar et al. 2020.

Nevertheless, standing facilities can be subject to stigma, which market participants
speculate may have limited the effectiveness of the PDCF (Ennis and Price 2020; Armantier,
Lee, and Sarkar 2015).
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Context: United States 2019–2020

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$21.694 trillion in 2019
$21.477 trillion in 2020
$65,280 in 2019
$63,414 in 2020
Data for 2019:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AA+u
Fitch: AAA

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Data for 2020:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AA+u
Fitch: AAA
$13.825 trillion in 2019
$15.882 trillion in 2020
63.73% in 2019
73.95% in 2020
27.14% in 2019
27.30% in 2020
45.74% in 2019
46.24% in 2020
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
Yes in 2019
Yes in 2020

Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, and World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The Fed established the PDCF to maintain the orderly function of
financial markets at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
On March 17, 2020, the Fed announced that it had authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (FRBNY) to extend collateralized credit to primary dealers for a term of up to 90
days (FRB 2020m). The stated purpose of the PDCF was to support the credit needs of
American households and businesses by fostering the functioning of financial markets more
generally and to expand the ability of primary dealers to gain access to term funding (FRB
2020i).
Specifically, by allowing primary dealers to borrow against a variety of assets on their
balance sheets, the PDCF intended to reduce the costs associated with holding inventory and
intermediating transactions between customers (Kargar et al. 2020; FRB 2020b). The Fed
expected the PDCF would add liquidity to the market for US Treasuries in particular, as
unprecedented sales volumes in March overwhelmed the capacity of dealers to intermediate
in that market (FRB 2020b).
2. Part of a Package: The PDCF was one of many initiatives the Fed undertook to
support market functioning and the flow of credit to households and businesses.
The PDCF worked in concert with other backstop facilities designed to provide targeted
liquidity to specific financial entities; namely, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF),
announced several hours before the PDCF, and the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity
Facility (MMLF), announced on March 18 (Boyarchenko, Kovner, and Shachar 2020; FSB
2020). The Fed also intervened in the dealer-intermediated secondary market for corporate
bonds through the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF) (FSB 2020; Kargar
et al. 2020).
3. Legal Authority: The PDCF was established under Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act.
The Federal Reserve Board authorized the PDCF by invoking its authority under Section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (FRB 2020m). Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act
permits the Fed, in “unusual and exigent circumstances,” to “discount for any participant in
any program or facility with broad-based eligibility” (FRB 2017, Sec. 13(3)(a)). The
invocation of Section 13(3) allows the Fed to provide liquidity more broadly than its
monetary policy and discount window authorities allow. Under Section 13(3), the Fed could
extend collateralized credit to primary dealers (FRB 2020m). The PDCF received the
unanimous approval of the five members of the Fed Board of Governors and the treasury
secretary 10 (FRB 2020m; Mnuchin 2020).

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 required Treasury pre-approval
for the establishment of programs like the PDCF; this stipulation did not exist for the GFC-era PDCF (CRS 2020).
10
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The PDCF was based on counterparty relationships already in place between primary
dealers and the New York Fed because of the latter’s role in conducting open market
operations (OMOs) (FRBNY, n.d.b).
4. Governance: The Fed provided Congress with periodic updates on the PDCF,
whose operations were subject to a three-phase review by Reserve Bank
Operations and Payment Systems and scrutinized by the Government
Accountability Office; extensions to the PDCF were subject to Regulation A and
Section 13(3) requirements.
Pursuant to Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed submitted reports to Congress
every 30 days including “the [aggregate] value of collateral, the amount of fees and other
items of value received; and the expected or final cost to the taxpayer” (FRB 2020e, 29–30).
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) required the Board to
publish these reports on its website within seven days of them being submitted to Congress;
although the PDCF was not funded by the CARES Act, the Board published the relevant
reports anyway (FRB 2020e).
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report examining the Fed’s overall
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as two reports on the Fed’s emergency lending
facilities. The reports did not include recommendations specific to the PDCF (GAO 2020a).
Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems (RBOPS), a division of the Federal Reserve
Board that oversees the policies and operations of the Reserve Banks, conducted a threephase review of Fed facilities (GAO 2020b). In the first phase, RBOPS assisted with the launch
of the facility (GAO 2020b). In the second phase, conducted no later than 45 days after the
Board authorized the facility, RBOPS focused its oversight of each facility on four areas: (1)
compliance, governance, and risk management; (2) credit and collateral; (3) processes and
controls; and (4) accounting and reporting (GAO 2020b). The third phase of RBOPS’s review
consisted of monitoring the Fed’s facilities (GAO 2020b). RBOPS communicated any control
or design gaps it identified, as well as recommendations for remediation, to Reserve Bank
management (GAO 2020b). RBOPS identified unspecified gaps in the design of controls for
the PDCF (GAO 2020b).
5. Administration: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York was responsible for
administration of the PDCF, with Bank of New York Mellon acting as the clearing
bank.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) administered the PDCF. FRBNY was
uniquely positioned to operate the PDCF because the facility relies on the relationships and
infrastructure built for its dealer trading counterparties who assist the FOMC in
implementing monetary policy (FRBNY, n.d.b). FRBNY also administered the GFC-era PDCF
with operational assistance from the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta and Chicago (GAO
2011).
Dealers typically fund themselves in the tri-party repo market which involves a clearing bank
that acts as an intermediary and handles the administrative details between the two
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parties11 (Duffie 2020; Paddrik, Ramírez, and McCormick 2021). For the PDCF, Bank of New
York Mellon (BNYM) executed the custody and arrangement of funding on behalf of the New
York Fed (FRBNY 2020b). In 2019 BNYM became the predominant clearing bank in the triparty repo market for US government securities, providing much of the collateral valuation,
margining, management services, transaction settlement, and custodial services (Paddrik,
Ramírez, and McCormick 2021).
6.

Communication: The Federal Reserve created the PDCF to provide liquidity to
primary dealers and support financial market functioning amid disruptions
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Fed established the PDCF to provide primary dealers with access to term funding as part
of a larger effort to support financial market functioning and the credit needs of US
households and businesses more broadly (FRB 2020m). Throughout the duration of the
facility, the Fed reiterated the role of the PDCF in helping dealers resume their market
intermediation and smooth market functioning (Martin and McLaughlin 2020; FRB 2020k;
FRB 2020l).
Similarly, the Fed created the 2008 PDCF to provide liquidity to primary dealers when
troubles at Bear Stearns negatively affected the market for triparty repurchase agreements
(Yang 2020; Martin and McLaughlin 2020).
The Fed made regular press releases accompanying decisions on the terms and rules related
to the PDCF.
7. Disclosure: The Federal Reserve Board provided monthly reports to Congress and
the public regarding its Section 13(3) emergency lending facilities, but delayed
disclosing the names of borrowers and funds and other details of PDCF
transactions until 2022.
Section 13(3), as amended by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), requires the Fed to present Congress with two types of
reports: 1) one submitted within a week after authorizing any loan, providing the
justification for the exercise and detailed information on the recipients and the amounts of
each transaction; and 2) a monthly update “regarding the value of collateral, the amount of
fees and other items of value received; and the expected or final cost to the taxpayer” (FRB
2017). In compliance with the second type of required report, the Fed provided monthly
reports to Congress with details on the PDCF including the aggregate amounts borrowed,
interest rate charged, and value of pledged collateral, as well as the overall costs, revenues,
and fees (FRB 2020i). These reports included more detailed aggregate data on the PDCF’s
outstanding loans than were included in the Fed’s weekly release of its balance sheet data
(FRB 2020c).
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) required the Fed to
publish monthly reports to the public about programs supported by CARES Act funds within
For a full discussion of the tri-party repo market, see Copeland, et al. (2012). For more information on the
role clearing banks play in tri-party repo, see Paddrik et al (2021) and Kahn and Olson (2021).
11
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seven days of delivering them to Congress (116th US Congress 2020). Although the PDCF
was not supported by CARES Act funds, the Fed released the required congressional PDCF
reports to the public anyway (FRB 2020e).
The Fed did not publicly disclose disaggregated details about PDCF transactions, unlike some
of the other emergency lending facilities12 (FRB 2020f). As allowed in the Dodd-Frank Act,
the Fed chair requested a delay in the release of confidential treatment of borroweridentifying information for the PDCF, MMLF, and CPFF to avoid adversely affecting these
facilities’ participants (GAO 2020b). The Fed was cognizant of the possibility that market
participants would view a firm’s use of these facilities as a sign of liquidity stress, which could
cause a run on the institution (GAO 2020b). However, Section 11(s) of the Federal Reserve
Act, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, requires the Fed to disclose detailed transactionlevel data within one year after the termination date of any credit facility; for the PDCF, this
deadline was March 31, 2022 (FRB 2020j, 12; FRB, n.d.a, sec. 11[s][2][A]).
8. Use of SPV: The PDCF did not utilize a special purpose vehicle.
The PDCF was not operated through an SPV.
9. Size: No explicit limit was announced for the PDCF, and there were no individual
participation limits.
The amount of funding that any primary dealer could borrow under the PDCF was limited
only by the amount of margin-adjusted eligible collateral that a primary dealer could present
to the clearing bank (FRB 2020n).
Use of the PDCF peaked at $35.6 billion the week of April 15 (FRB 2020q). For context,
broker-dealers held about $3.5 trillion in assets in Q4 2019 (FRB 2020b). As of August 2021,
primary dealers funded an average of $600 billion in daily trade volume while non-primary
dealers funded $71 billion (Paddrik, Ramírez, and McCormick 2021).
10. Source of Funding: The PDCF was funded through the creation of reserves by the
Federal Reserve.
The PDCF functioned as a loan facility for primary dealers, similar to the way the Federal
Reserve’s discount window provides a backup source of funding to depository institutions.
Credit extended by the Federal Reserve through the PDCF was collateralized (FRBNY 2020c).
The Fed recorded PDCF loans as assets on its balance sheet (Hoops and Kurtzman 2021). As
dealers paid back loans, the Fed extinguished the reserves (FRB 2020c).
11. Eligible Institutions: 24 primary dealers were eligible for credit under the PDCF.
The PDCF utilized the New York Fed’s existing operational relationships with primary
dealers and the tri-party repo system that is used for OMOs. Primary dealers are trading
See the Main Street Lending Programs by Kelly (2021) and the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility and
Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility by Leonard (2021).
12
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counterparties of the New York Fed in its implementation of monetary policy. The PDCF
extended 356 individual loans to 21 primary dealers (see Figure 5) (FRB 2022).
Figure 5: Cumulative Loan Amounts Extended to PDCF Borrowers
Cumulative
Loan Amount
($thousands)

Borrower
Amherst Pierpont Securities LLC

Loans
Extended

418,500

86

70,000

3

Barclays Capital Inc.

3,361,000

11

BMO Capital Markets Corp.

2,833,000

8

14,400,000

7

50

1

Cantor Fitzgerald & Co.

4,500,000

74

Citigroup Global Markets Inc.

6,500,000

5

Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.

Bank of Nova Scotia, New York Agency

BNP Paribas Securities Corp.
BofA Securities, Inc.

11,189,187

51

Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC

4,700,000

3

J.P. Morgan Securities LLC

60,350,000

29

Jefferies LLC

767,706

19

Mizuho Securities USA LLC

250,000

1

Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC

500,000

1

NatWest Markets Securities Inc.

570,000

3

Nomura Securities International, Inc.

2,335,000

15

RBC Capital Markets, LLC

8,168,000

7

51,000

2

TD Securities (USA) LLC

4,550,000

6

UBS Securities LLC

3,412,000

20

Wells Fargo Securities, LLC

3,775,000

4

132,700,443

356

Société Générale, New York Branch

Total

Source: FRB 2022.
Securities dealers play a critical role in short-term markets by marketing, underwriting, and
transacting in a range of securities; using their balance sheets to make markets; and
providing liquidity by buying and selling securities from their own holdings (FRB 2020b).
Large dealers, most of whom are subsidiaries of bank holding companies13, use short-term
secured funding markets to fund their inventory of securities14 (FRB 2020b). Primary
dealers are heavily reliant on short-term lending markets in their role as securities market
makers, but, unlike banks, cannot access the discount window (FRBNY 2020b).

13 Because dealer subsidiaries are just one business line to which large banks allocate capital, liquidity, and risk,

dealers were further constrained in March 2020 by demands to hold greater margin collateral, loan requests
from bank customers, and requests for heightened levels of intermediation in other assets (Duffie 2020).
14 Dealers also source funding from banks and other dealers (FRB 2020b).
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Use of the GFC-era PDCF was restricted to the 20 primary dealers at the time, but included
the London-based affiliates of four primary dealers. Ultimately, 18 primary dealers tapped
the 2008 PDCF (Yang 2020).
12. Auction or Standing Facility: The PDCF was a standing facility, accessible at the
borrower’s election.
The PDCF was a standing facility (FRB 2020j). Under the PDCF, dealers contacted BNYM with
their funding needs, normally by 2:00pm ET, and BNYM would verify that eligible collateral
had been pledged. BNYM then notified FRBNY when a sufficient amount of eligible, marginadjusted collateral had been assigned to FRBNY’s tri-party account, at which point FRBNY
transferred the amount of the loan to BNYM for credit to the primary dealer, normally
around 5:00pm ET on the same day (FRB 2020n).
13. Loan or Purchase: The PDCF extended recourse loans to primary dealers.
The extension of credit under the PDCF depended on the New York Fed’s relationships and
processes established as part of the primary dealer system. To mitigate risk, the Fed applied
haircuts and had a clearing bank value the collateral at the least available value and revalue
it daily (FRBNY 2020b). Loans to primary dealers under the PDCF were made “with recourse
beyond the collateral to the broker-dealer entity itself,” assuring the Fed’s protection in the
event of a borrower default (FRBNY 2020b). Dealers were permitted to prepay PDCF loans
(FRBNY 2020b).
14. Eligible Collateral: The PDCF accepted OMO-eligible collateral and a broad range
of investment-grade debt securities, including commercial paper and municipal
bonds, and equity securities.
The PDCF accepted all collateral eligible for OMOs: US Treasury, agency, and agency
mortgage-backed securities (FRBNY 2020b). The PDCF also accepted non-OMO-eligible
collateral, including equity securities, money market instruments, and investment-grade
municipal and corporate securities (see Figures 6 and 7) (FRBNY 2020c).
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Figure 6: Securities Pledged to the PDCF, by Type

Security
Corporate market instruments

Amount
Pledged
($millions)
44,519

Asset-backed

26,233

Equities

19,936

Municipal

18,943

Money market instruments

16,196

MBS/CMO: other

11,889

US Treasury/agency

5,077

MBS/CMO: agency-backed

3,108

Agency Credit Risk Transfer

2,184
574

International

Source: FRB 2022.
In March 2020, high demand for liquidity and unusual selling pressure caused dislocations
in the US Treasuries market, which is critical to overall financial market functioning and the
transmission of monetary policy (TIC 2021; He, Nagel, and Song 2020; Brainard 2018).
Primary dealers also act as market markers for other fixed-income securities, equity
securities, and other securities in markets that experienced dislocations. The terms of the
PDCF were designed to accommodate this variety, accepting investment-grade corporate
debt securities, international agency securities, commercial paper, municipal securities,
mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and equity securities (excluding ETFs,
unit investment trusts, mutual funds, rights, and warrants) (FRBNY 2020c). Only US-dollar
denominated collateral was accepted (FRB 2020n). Unlike the discount window, the PDCF
accepted equity securities as collateral for loans and did not accept foreign-exchange
denominated assets or whole loans (FRBNY 2020b; FRB 2021b). In addition, credit under
the PDCF was extended in the form of a repurchase agreement transaction (FRBNY 2020b).
Figure 7: Securities Ratings
Security /
Rating
Treasury
Agency

Amount
($millions)
4,797
3,388

Percent
of Total
3.23%
2.28%

AAA
AA
A
BBB
A-1
A-2

32,757
16,380
25,789
29,416
13,866
2,330

22.03%
11.02%
17.35%
19.79%
9.33%
1.57%

Equity

19,936

13.41%

Source: FRB 2022.

Obligations issued by the borrower or its affiliates
were not eligible (FRBNY 2020b). Most of the assets
financed in the PDCF were experiencing volatility and
pressure in March 2020, including corporate and
municipal debt, asset-backed securities, and
commercial paper (Martin and McLaughlin 2020).
The 2008 PDCF defined “eligible collateral” as all
collateral eligible for pledge under tri-party
repurchase agreements. As a result, the 2008 program
included some noninvestment-grade securities and
whole loans that the 2020 PDCF did not accept (Yang
2020).
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15. Loan Amounts: Borrowers were only limited by the value of collateral they
pledged to the facility; specific loan amounts were made available on March 31,
2022.
FRBNY extended a principal amount equal to the value of the collateral pledged to secure the
advance less a risk-adjusted haircut; there were no other restrictions on primary dealers’
use of the facility (FRB 2020j). In the event collateral was downgraded, the primary dealer
would need to replace the security with eligible collateral to maintain full collateralization
or terminate the loan (FRBNY 2020b).
16. Haircuts: Haircuts were equivalent to haircuts under open market operations or
calculated according to the risk of the collateral pledged.
Haircuts assigned to OMO-eligible collateral were equivalent to haircuts under open market
operations (FRBNY 2020c). For collateral not eligible for OMO, haircuts were assigned
according to the asset’s risk (FRBNY 2020c). BNYM valued the collateral according to a
collateral schedule sent from FRBNY to primary dealers and BNYM (see Appendix); this was
designed to be similar to the margin schedule for lending to commercial banks at the
discount window15 (FRB 2020n). The Fed stated that the collateral schedule could be
adjusted “as conditions warrant and upon further analysis” (FRBNY 2020b).
The 2008 PDCF also assigned haircuts to OMO-eligible collateral that were equivalent to
haircuts under the OMOs. Haircuts for non-OMO eligible collateral were determined by the
asset’s risk and generally higher than under OMO standards (Yang 2020).
17. Interest Rates: Loans were extended at the primary credit rate.
The interest rate for the loan was based on the primary credit (discount window) rate
offered to depository institutions at the time the loan was originated. On March 15, the Fed
announced it would lower the primary credit rate by 50 basis points to 25 basis points (the
upper bound of the federal funds rate). Reducing the spread between the primary credit rate
and the general level of overnight interest rates was intended “to help encourage more active
use of the window by depository institutions to meet unexpected funding needs” (FRB
2020o; FRB 2020a). From the facility’s launch in March 2020 to its expiration a year later,
the primary credit rate remained at 25 basis points (FRB 2020n).
Under normal conditions, the primary credit rate exceeds the overnight repo rate for most
eligible securities (FRBNY, n.d.a). As a result, the PDCF was not an especially attractive
means of financing an inventory of securities in normal market conditions (GAO 2020b). The
Fed set the rate for the PDCF according to the principles of penalty rates in Regulation A 16;
namely, that the rate “is a premium to the market rate in normal circumstances” but “affords
liquidity in unusual and exigent circumstances” (FRB 2015; 12 CFR, n.d.; GAO 2020b, 12; COC
2020, 33). Fed officials told the Government Accountability Office that charging such a rate
For most eligible collateral, the haircut applied at the PDCF aligns to the haircut applied to the longest-dated
tenor of that collateral type at the discount window (FRB 2021b; FRBNY 2020c).
16 The 2015 amendment to Regulation A calls for the Fed to charge a “penalty rate” on all lending through 13(3)
emergency lending facilities (FRB 2015).
15

1948

United States

Mott

ensured “the facilities would experience limited participation when credit is available in the
marketplace and increased participation when markets declined and there was a shortage
of credit” (GAO 2020b, 12). The PDCF was designed to be self-liquidating, meaning dealers
were incentivized to use the PDCF only as a backstop, not as a primary funding source once
markets returned to normal (GAO 2020b).
The GFC-era PDCF also charged the primary credit rate; throughout the duration of the
facility this represented a 25 basis point premium to the upper limit of the fed funds rate
(Yang 2020, 13).
18. Fees: The Fed did not impose any fees for using the PDCF, however the clearing
bank imposed normal tri-party fees.
The PDCF did not charge borrowers a frequency-based fee, but primary dealers did pay
normal tri-party fees to BNYM (FRBNY 2020b).
In contrast, the GFC-era PDCF charged a frequency-based penalty fee on primary dealers that
accessed the facility on more than 30 days out of any 120 days. The fee was later revised
based on use of the facility for more than 45 business days out of the preceding 180 business
days (Yang 2020).
19. Term: PDCF credit had a maturity up to 90 days.
The PDCF offered credit for up to a 90-day term. This brought the facility’s terms in line with
changes to the discount window, which, as of March 15, 2020, also allowed depository
institutions to obtain secured liquidity for up to 90 days (FRBNY 2020b; FRB 2020a). The
median term of the borrowing of the COVID-era PDCF was 14 days, and most borrowing was
longer than overnight (see Figure 8) (FRB 2022; Martin and McLaughlin 2020). As the
remaining maturity of the loan declined, the primary dealer could choose to prepay the loan
and request a new loan up to 90 days (FRBNY 2020b).
The GFC-era PDCF only offered overnight loans (Yang 2020).
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Figure 8: Duration of PDCF Loans by Origination Date
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Source: FRB 2022.
20. Other Restrictions on Eligible Participants: There were no other restrictions on
PDCF participants.
There were no other restrictions on PDCF participants.
21. Regulatory Relief: The Fed did not offer regulatory relief to PDCF participants.
Although the Fed and other financial regulators provided relief from regulation around this
time, no regulatory changes were made to specifically accommodate participants in the
PDCF.
22. International Coordination: The Fed did not coordinate with other jurisdictions
when designing or operating the PDCF.
The Fed did not coordinate with other jurisdictions when designing or operating the PDCF.
23. Duration: After two extensions beyond its initial expiration date of six months, the
PDCF ceased extending credit on March 31, 2021.
The PDCF began extending credit on March 20, 2020, and was designed to continue for “at
least six months, or longer if conditions warrant” (FRBNY 2020b). On July 28, the Fed
announced that it would extend several 13(3) emergency lending facilities, including the
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PDCF, through December 31, 2020 (FRB 2020k). On November 30, the Fed announced a
further extension of the PDCF to March 31, 2021, along with three other 13(3) programs: the
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
(MMLF), and the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) (FRB 2020l). When
announcing both extensions, the Fed acknowledged that “financial markets have stabilized
significantly,” but pointed to “the presence and extent of volatility and illiquidity in financial
markets” and “the price and availability of credit in the market . . . as compared to normal
market conditions” as justification for their continued operations (FRB 2020d; FRB 2020g).
The PDCF, along with the CPFF and MMLF, expired on March 31, 2021, while the Fed
continued to invoke its 13(3) authorities to operate the PPPLF. All loans made by FRBNY
through the PDCF were repaid by April 30, 2021 (FRB 2021a).
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Appendix

OMO-eligible collateral

Figure 5: Primary Dealer Credit Facility Collateral Schedule
COLLATERAL TYPE
Treasury Obligations
Bills, Notes, and Bonds (incl. Inflation-Indexed Securities)
STRIPS and Synthetic Treasuries (incl. Strips of
Inflation-Indexed Securities)
Agency Obligations*
Fixed and Floating Rate Debentures
Interest and Principal Strips
Agency and Private Label MBS Pass-Throughs and CMOs**
Agency Single-Family, Pass-Through Securities
Agency CMBS
Agency REMICS/CMOs

MARGIN %

-

104

-

108

-

105
109

A-/A3/A- or above
BBB-/Baa3/BBB- or above

105
105
106
115
159

Private Label Residential MBS

BBB-/Baa3/BBB- or above

141

Private Label CMBS

AAA/Aaa/AAA

113

A2/P2/F2 or above

105

Agency Residential Credit Risk Transfer Securities

Domestic

RATING

Money Market Instruments
Commercial Paper, Bankers Acceptances, Certificates of
Deposit, and Bank Notes
Equities
Common Stock, Preferred Stock, and American
Depository Receipts
Municipal Securities

-

120

BBB-/Baa3/BBB- or above

107

AAA/Aaa/AAA
AA-/Aa3/AA- or above
A-/A3/A- or above
BBB-/Baa3/BBB- or above
A-/A3/A- or above
BBB-/Baa3/BBB- or above

108
109
110
113
110
113

Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs)

AAA/Aaa/AAA

125

Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs)

AAA/Aaa/AAA

122

Corporate Securities

Asset-backed securities

Int`l

Supranational Agency Securities
BBB-/Baa3/BBB- or above
106
107
Sovereign/Foreign Gov’t Agency/Foreign Gov’t Guaranteed A-/A3/A- or above
Securities
BBB-/Baa3/BBB- or above
109
Note: Margin percentages are calculated by dividing the value of the collateral pledged by the loan amount.
REMICS refers to Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits. CMO refers to Collateralized Mortgage
Obligations. CMBS refers to Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities. *Direct obligations of the following
federally related entities: Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac); Federal Farm Credit Banks
Funding Corporation (Farm Credit System); Federal Home Loan Bank System; Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac); Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae); Financing Corporation
(FICO); Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCO); Small Business Administration (SBA); Student Loan
Marketing Association (SLMA); or Tennessee Valley Authority. **Excludes trust receipts. Agency refers to
securities issued and/or fully guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage Association, Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association, or Farmers Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation.
Source: FRBNY 2020c.
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